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SEARCHING FOR PEACE AND
ACHIEVING JUSTICE:  THE NEED FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY
M.  CHERIF BASSIOUNI
*
The world rests on three pillars: on truth, on justice[,] and on peace.
Rabban Simeon ben Gamaliel, (Abot 1, 18)
A Talmudic commentary adds to this, saying: “The three are really one.  If justice is re-
alized, truth is vindicated and peace results.”
***
If you see a wrong you must right it;
with your hand if you can [meaning by action], or,
with your words, or,
with your stare, or
in your heart, and that is the weakest of faith.
Prophet Mohammed, Hadith (Saying)
***





Since World War II, the number of conflicts of an international character
declined as did their harmful impact, in comparison to other types of conflicts
whose harmful consequences increased.  Indeed, the occurrence of conflicts of
a non-international character and purely internal conflicts has dramatically in-
creased in number, intensity, and victimization.  In addition, tyrannical regimes
produced systematic and large scale-victimization far exceeding quantitatively
and qualitatively the harmful results generated by all other types of conflicts.2
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1.  Celebration of the World Day of Peace, January 1, 1972, in WAYS OF PEACE: PAPAL MESSAGES
FOR THE WORLD DAYS OF  PEACE (1968-1986), Vatican City.
2. See DANIEL CHIROT, MODERN TYRANTS: THE POWER AND PREVALENCE OF EVIL IN OUR
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Conflicts of a non-international character, purely internal conflicts, and ty-
rannical regime victimization have occurred all over the world.  That victimiza-
tion has included genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, along
with, inter alia, extra-judicial executions, torture, and arbitrary arrest and de-
tention, all of which constitute serious violations of fundamental human rights
protected by international human rights law.3
During the course of the twentieth century it is estimated that conflicts of a
non-international character, internal conflicts, and tyrannical regime victimiza-
tion have resulted in more than 170 million deaths.4  This is compared with an
estimated 33 million military casualties.5  It is estimated that since World War
II, more than 250 conflicts of a non-international character, internal conflicts,
and tyrannical regime victimization have occurred.  These situations have re-
sulted in an estimated 86 million casualties.6
                                                          
AGE (1994); PIERRE HASSNER, VIOLENCE AND PEACE: FROM THE ATOMIC BOMB TO ETHNIC
CLEANSING (1995); RUDOLPH J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT (1994); see also ERIK
HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 1914-1991 (1995).  The figure
used by Mr. Hobsbawm is 187 million “people killed or allowed to die by human decision” for the
“short century” that he examines.  Hobsbawm notes that this accounts for about 10% of the global
population at the year 1900.  The category “by human decision” includes non-wartime politically-
caused deaths such as those in the Soviet Union (1930s Ukranian starvation and the “Gulag”) and in
China between 1949 and 1975 (the massive starvation of the “Great Leap Forward” and various
“repression campaigns”).  However, likely deaths in those two countries for political government-
decided reasons are on the order of 35 million and 45 million respectively, or 80 million, for a total of
around 205 million, rather than Hobsbawm’s figure of 187 million.
3. For the applicable norms, see THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW (1989).  See also, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS: TEXT AND MATERIALS (1996); RICHARD B.
LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE (1991); FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
(1990).
4. See RUMMEL, supra note 2, at 3, 9 (reports a total of 72.521 million casualties).
5. See id.
6. See SIPRI YEARBOOKS 1975-1996.  There were two reported studies in the PIOOM newsletter
and progress report in 1994 and 1995: A.J. Jongman & A.P. Schmid, Contemporary Conflicts: A Global
Survey of High- and Lower Intensity Conflicts and Serious Disputes, 7 PIOOM NEWSLETTER AND
PROGRESS REPORT 14 (Winter 1995) (Interdisciplinary Research Program on Causes of Human
Rights Violations, Leiden, Netherlands), and Study, 6 PIOOM NEWSLETTER 17 (1994); see also supra
note 3; Alex P. Schmid, Early Warning of Violent Conflicts: Causal Approaches, in VIOLENT CRIME &
CONFLICTS 47 (ISPAC 1997); PIOOM World Conflict Map 1994-1995, 7 PIOOM NEWSLETTER, supra.
The following are some illustrations of situations producing a high level of victimization (estimated
conflict deaths), including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes for which there has been
no accountability:
(a)Conflicts of an international character: Afghanistan (1979-89) 1.5 m; Vietnam
(1945-87) 3.7 m.
(b)Conflicts of a non-international character: Angola (1975-94) 1.5 m; Bangladesh
(1971-73) .5 m; Burundi (1972) 250,000; Cambodia(1975-85) 1.5 m; Ethiopia (1961-
91) 300,000; Mozambique (1978-92) 1 m; Rwanda (1994) 500,000; Somalia (1991-
93) 400,000; Yemen (1962-65) 100,000.
(c)Purely internal conflicts: Argentina (1976-83) 25,000; Chile (1973-90) 30,000; El
Salvador (1979-92) 70,000; Guatemala (1965-96) 60,000; Indonesia (1965) 450,000,
(1980-95) 150,000; Lebanon (1975-90) 150,000; Liberia (1989-96) 150,000; Peru
(1980-96) 50,000; Philippines (1968-86) 50,000.
(d)Tyrannical regime victimization: China (1945-75) 35 m; Iraq (1980-96) 300,000;
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Yet notwithstanding this high level of victimization, there have been few
prosecutions, whether at the international or national level.  In fact, since the
post-World War II prosecutions, there have been only two internationally es-
tablished ad hoc investigatory commissions and two ad hoc tribunals for Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda respectively,7 one international truth commission for El-
Salvador8 (which did not generate prosecutions, however), two national prose-
cution systems established in the aftermath of conflicts in Ethiopia and
Rwanda, some select national prosecutions in Argentina9 and Chile10 where a
national inquiry commission was also set up, and a special body called The
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa,11 from which some
prosecutions may be generated.  In some Eastern and Central European coun-
tries, “lustration” laws have been passed to remove persons of the past regime
from office, but only a few prosecutions have taken place.12  For all practical
purposes, very little else has occurred, and even these accountability mecha-
nisms have produced few tangible results.  Only a few of the perpetrators of the
crimes described above have ever faced justice, including those who committed
jus cogens crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
torture for which there is a duty to prosecute and punish.  Furthermore, even
the basic truth of what happened in these conflicts—how they evolved and why,
and by whom such victimization occured, and what was the quantum of victimi-
zation—has also seldom been exposed by governmental bodies or international
ones.  That task has been mainly undertaken, with all its understandable limita-
tions, by NGOs, dedicated journalists, and committed researchers, to whom so
much is owed for fulfilling this needed task.
The question arises as to why there have been so few instances of prosecu-
tion and other accountability mechanisms?  The answer is that justice is all too
frequently bartered away for political settlements.  Whether in international,
non-international, or purely internal conflicts the practice of impunity has be-
                                                          
North Korea (1948-87) 1.6 m; ; Uganda (1971-86) 600,000; USSR (1917-89) 30 m;
Yugoslavia (1943-45) 500,000, (1991-95) 250,000.
7. M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a
Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 13 (1997).
8. See FROM MADNESS TO HOPE: THE 12-YEAR WAR IN EL SALVADOR, REPORT OF THE
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON THE TRUTH FOR EL SALVADOR, U.N. Doc. S/25500 (1993).
9. See NUNCA MÁS, INFORME DE LA COMISION SOBRE LA DESAPARICION DE PERSONAS (1985);
CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996).
10. See REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
(Philip E. Berryman trans., 1993); Edward C. Snyder, The Dirty Legal War: Human Rights and the
Rule of Law in Chile, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 253, 279 (1995).
11. See Lynn Berat & Yossi Shain, Retribution or Truth-telling in South Africa? Legacies of the
Transitional Phase, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 163 (1995); Ziyad Motala, The Promotion of National
Unity and Reconciliation Act, the Constitution and International Law, 28 COMP. & INT. L. J. S. AFRICA
338 (1995).
12. See generally III TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH
FORMER REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995); Maria Loñ, Lustration and Truth Claims: Unfinished
Revolutions in Central Europe, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 117 (1995); Adrienne M. Quill, To Prosecute
or Not to Prosecute: Problems Encountered in the Prosecution of Former Communist Officials in Ger-
many, Czechoslovakia, and the Czech Republic, 7 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 165, 188-91 (1996).
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come the political price paid to secure an end to the violence of ongoing con-
flicts or as a means to ensure tyrannical regime changes.13  In these bartered set-
tlements, the victims’ rights become the objects of political trade-offs, and jus-
tice becomes, depending upon one’s perspective, the victim of the means of
Realpolitik.
Bartering away justice for political results, albeit in the pursuit of peace is
the goal of most political leaders who seek to end conflicts or facilitate transi-
tions to non-tyrannical regimes.  The grim reality is that in order to obtain
peace, negotiations must be held with the very leaders who frequently are the
ones who committed, ordered, or allowed terrible crimes to be committed.
Thus, the choice presented to negotiators is whether to have peace or justice.
Sometimes this dichotomy is presented along more sophisticated lines: peace
now, and justice some other time.14  The choice is, however, frequently falla-
cious and the dichotomy may be tragically deceptive.  Surely no one can argue
that peace is unnecessary and preferable to a state of violence.  But the attain-
ment of peace is not necessarily to the exclusion of justice, because justice is
frequently necessary to attain peace.
The question thus arises as to the meaning of the word peace, its scope,
goals, and duration.  Indeed, the word peace is freely used in the context of
ending conflicts or ensuring transition to non-tyrannical regimes but without
being defined or, more particularly, without any identification of what the
peace goal is or how long the purported peace is designed to last.  There is
therefore a wide range to what peace can mean.  In the political discourse of
ending conflicts it ranges from the cessation or absence of hostilities to popular
reconciliation and forgiveness between social groups previously in conflict with
one another.  It also includes the removal of a tyrannical regime or leader, and
the effectuation of a regime change.  The processes of attaining peace, what-
ever the intended outcomes may be, vary in accordance with the type of con-
flict, its participants, the level of victimization, the manner in which the victimi-
zation occurred, other destructive conduct by opposing groups, and popular
                                                          
13. See Progress Report on the Question of Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations,
prepared by Mr. Guissé and Mr. Joinet, pursuant to Sub-Commission Resolution 1992/23, Sub-
Commission on Prevention and Protection of all Minorities, 45th Sess., Item 10(a) (July 19, 1993)
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/6, at 29; Progress Report on the Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Viola-
tions of Human Rights (civil and political rights), prepared by Mr. Joinet, pursuant to Sub-Commission
Resolution 1994/34, Sub-Commission on Prevention and Protection of all Minorities, 47th Sess., Item
10 (June 28, 1995) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/18; Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Violations of
Human Rights (civil and political rights): Final Report prepared by Mr. Joinet, pursuant to Sub-
Commission Resolution 1995/35, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, 48th Sess., Item 10 (June 29, 1996) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/18, at 5; NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA,
IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 14 (1995); Stephen P.
Marks, Forgetting the Policies and Practices of the Past: Impunity in Cambodia, FLETCHER F. 17
(1994); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991); Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There
a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1 (1996); Robert O. Weiner,
Trying to Make Ends Meet: Reconciling the Law and Practice of Human Rights Amnesties, 26 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 857, 867 (1995).
14. For a critical appraisal of that practice, see Luc Huyse, Justice After Transition: On the Choices
Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the Past, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 51, 77-78 (1995).
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perceptions of what occurred, as well as the future expectations of popular rec-
onciliation between, or co-existence among opposing groups.  Peace, therefore,
encompasses a wide range of policy options, some of which could be combined
to attain it.  But in a world order based on the rule of law and not on the rule of
might, the attainment of peace to end conflicts cannot be totally severed from
the pursuit of justice whenever that may be required in the aftermath of vio-
lence.  Granted, peace and justice are ideals founded on certain values whose
meanings vary epistemologically and according to group and individual beliefs.
Yet however relative these ideals and their outcomes may be, they are none-
theless subject to the world community’s norms and standards which represent
the threshold of international legality.  If peace is not intended to be a brief in-
terlude between conflicts, then in order to avoid future conflict, it must encom-
pass what justice is intended to accomplish:  prevent, deter, punish, and reha-
bilitate.
Realists and Realpolitik proponents argue that every conflict is sui generis
and that the variables of each conflict are so diverse that they cannot be catego-
rized or characterized in a way that a common international legal regime can
apply to all these heterogeneous conflicts.  However, while there is no doubt
that every conflict has its own peculiarities, and can even be labeled sui generis,
that in itself does not and cannot exclude the application of existing interna-
tional legal norms such as those relative to the regulation of armed conflicts of
an international character and of a non-international character as well as to
“crimes against humanity,” genocide, and torture—the latter three categories
of international crimes being applicable in times of war and of peace, irrespec-
tive of the legal characterization and nature of the conflict.
II
THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
The normative framework that applies to armed conflicts, whether of an in-
ternational or non-international character and to internal conflicts, has certain
weaknesses and gaps.  While conflicts of an international character are ade-
quately covered by the four Geneva Conventions of 194915 and Protocol I of
1977,16 conflicts of a non-international character are less adequately covered
under common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions but more so under Proto-
                                                          
15. See the Four Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949: Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and the Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention No. I),
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention No. II),
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War (Geneva Convention No. III), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War (Geneva Convention No. IV), Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 28.   For “grave breaches,” see articles 49 (I), 129 (III), 146 (IV), and for con-
flicts of a non-international character, see common article 3.
16. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, Art. 4, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I].  See especially arts. 11, 85, 86.
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col II of 1977.17  Furthermore, purely internal conflicts and tyrannical regime
victimization are not subject to these and other aspects of the regulation of
armed conflicts, including the customary law of armed conflicts.18  Nevertheless,
crimes against humanity,19 genocide,20 and torture21 apply to all these contexts,
                                                          
17. Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter Protocol II].
18. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, signed at Paris, 13 January 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO.
103-21, 32 I.L.M. 800, entered into force 29 April 1997; Convention on Prohibitions and Restrictions on
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to
have Indiscriminate Effects, concluded at Geneva, 10 October 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.95/15, 1342
U.N.T.S. 7, 19 I.L.M. 1523, entered into force 2 December 1983, including Protocol on Non-Detectable
Fragments to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons [Protocol I], adopted at Geneva, 10 October 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.95/15 (1980), 19
I.L.M. 1529, entered into force 2 December 1983, Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, Appendix C, [Protocol II], adopted at Geneva, 10 October
1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.95/15 (1980), 19 I.L.M. 1529, entered into force 2 December 1983, and Pro-
tocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons to the Convention on Prohibi-
tions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons [Protocol III], adopted at Geneva,
10 October 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.95/15 (1980), 19 I.L.M. 1534, entered into force 2 December 1983
with provisions; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed at Washington, Lon-
don and Moscow, 10 April 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, 11 I.L.M. 309, entered into force 26
March 1975; the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict and certain weapons conventions such as:  Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of As-
phyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva,
17 June 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, 14 I.L.M. 49; Convention Respecting the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention].
19. See Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind:  Titles and texts of articles on
the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind adopted by the International
Law Commission at its forty-eighth session (1996), U.N. GAOR Int’l Law Comm., 48th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 (1996), July 15, 1996, revised by U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532/corr. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.532/corr.3; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted at New York, Nov. 8,
1994, S.C.Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 1598, 1602; Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted at New
York, May 25, 1993, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1192; European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes (Inter-European), signed at Strasbourg, Jan.
25, 1974, Europ. T.S. No. 82, 13 I.L.M. 540, not yet entered into force; Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, opened for sig-
nature at New York, Nov. 26, 1968, G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 40, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2391 (1968), 754 U.N.T.S. 73, 8 I.L.M. 68, entered into force Nov. 1970; Principles of In-
ternational Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the
Tribunal, adopted at Geneva, July 29, 1950, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12), at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316
(1950), 44 AM. J. INT’L L. 126 (1950); Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized
by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal (United Nations General Assembly Resolution), adopted at
New York, Dec. 11, 1946, U.N. G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc.A/64/Add.1 (1946); International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, proclaimed at Tokyo, 19 Jan. 19, 1946 and amended Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S.
No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20; Control Council Law No. 10 (Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity), adopted at Berlin, Dec. 20, 1945, Official Gazette of
the Control Council for Germany, No. 3, Berlin, Jan. 31, 1946, reprinted in BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, 1
AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 488 (1980); Agreement for
the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis [London Charter],
signed at London, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 3 Bevans 1238, entered into force Aug.
8, 1945.
20. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 1
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irrespective of legal characterization or the nature of the conflict.  Yet crimes
against humanity have yet to be embodied in a specialized convention that
would clarify certain ambiguities relative to its earlier formulation in Article
6(c) of the International Military Tribunal’s Statute.22  In addition, both geno-
cide and crimes against humanity also have certain normative weaknesses.  As
to genocide, certain groups are not included in the Convention’s protective
scheme, and the requirement of a specific intent required by the Convention is
a high threshold, which frequently is difficult to prove.  Lastly, there is an obvi-
ous overlap between genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as an over-
lap between these two crimes and war crimes.  These overlaps need to be clari-
fied.
Notwithstanding the weaknesses and gaps in the normative framework of
the three major categories of international crimes, namely genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes (irrespective of context), there is also a sig-
nificant weakness in the practice of states with respect to the carrying out of the
underpinning of these normative proscriptives, namely the duty to prosecute or
extradite and for states to cooperate with each other in the investigation, prose-
cution, and adjudication of those charged with such crimes and the punishment
of those who are convicted of such crimes.23  Although the duty to prosecute or
extradite exists in the Genocide Convention,24 the Geneva Conventions of
1949,25 and Protocol I of 1977,26 it does not exist in conventional law with re-
spect to crimes against humanity due to the fact that there is no specialized
convention for such crimes.27  Nor do these obligations explicitly exist with re-
                                                          
U.N. GAOR Res. 96 (Dec. 11, 1946) 78 U.N.T.S. 277; see also Statute of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda, adopted at New York, Nov. 8, 1994, S.C.Res. 955, U.N.SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598; Statute of the International Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia, adopted at New York, May 25, 1993, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th
mtg., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159.
21. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, U.N. G.A. Res. 39/46, opened for signature at New York, Feb. 4, 1985, entered into force June
26, 1987, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027; see also Treaty or European Convention for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Inter-European), opened for signature
at Strasbourg, Nov. 26, 1987, Europ. T.S. No. 126, 27 I.L.M. 1152, entered into force Feb. 1, 1989; Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, done at Cartagena de Indias, Dec. 9, 1985,
AG/Res. 783 (XV-0/85), O.A.S. General Assembly, 15th Sess. IEA/Ser.P. AG/Doc. 22023/85 rev. 1 at
46-54 (1986), O.A.S. Treaty Series, No. 67, entered into force Feb. 28, 1987, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 519;
United State Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (ECOSOC Resolution),
adopted at Geneva, 1955, ECOSOC Res. 663C (LXIV), July 31, 1957, and 2076 (XXII), May 13, 1977,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.6/1, Annex I.A.
22. The 1945 International Military Tribunal to Prosecute the Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Theatre [hereinafter IMT].
23. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Modalities of Inter-State Cooperation in Penal Matters, in IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., forthcoming 2d rev. ed. 1997); see also
EUROPEAN INTER-STATE CO-OPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS (Ekkehart Mühller-Rappard & M.
Cherif Bassiouni eds., 1993).
24. Supra note 20.
25. Supra note 15.
26. Supra note 16.
27. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Crimes against Humanity”: The Need for a Specialized Convention,
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spect to common articles 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol II,28
applicable to conflicts of a non-international character even though it can be
argued that such obligations exist implicitly.  It should be noted, however, that
in 1971 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Resolution on War
Criminals,29 affirming that a State’s refusal “to cooperate in the arrest, extradi-
tion, trial, and punishment” of persons accused or convicted of war crimes and
crimes against humanity is “contrary to the United Nations Charter and to gen-
erally recognized norms of international law,”30 and in 1973 a resolution was
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly entitled Principles of Inter-
national Co-operation in the Detention, Arrest, Extradition, and Punishment of
Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.31  However, no
specialized international convention has been passed on that subject, and there-
fore the duty to prosecute or to extradite, while argued for by scholars, must
nonetheless be proven part of customary international law in the absence of a
specific convention establishing such an obligation.32
Of course, the duty to prosecute or to extradite could not be effective if
statutes of limitations applied.  Thus in 1968 the United Nations adopted a
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity,33 and, similarly, in 1974, the Council of Europe
adopted a European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limita-
tions to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes (Inter-European).34  It is dis-
turbing, however, that the U.N. Convention has been ratified by only fifty-four
states,35 and the European Convention by one state,36 thus indicating a certain
reluctance on the part of the 185 member states of the United Nations to sup-
port the proposition that no time prescriptions should apply to these crimes,
thus making more difficult their prosecution.  Surely the existence of statutes of
limitations weakens the underpinnings of a normative scheme that already has
certain troublesome gaps.
There exists another impediment to the national enforcement of genocide,
                                                          
31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 457 (1994).
28. See supra note 17.
29. G.A. Res. 2840 (XXVI) 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29), at 88, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
30. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 499-527 (1992).
31. G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
32. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE, AUT JUDICARE (1995).
33. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, opened for signature at New York, Nov. 26, 1968, G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR,
23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2391 (1968), 754 U.N.T.S. 73, 8 I.L.M. 68, entered into
force Nov. 1970.
34. See European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes against
Humanity and War Crimes (Inter-European), opened for signature at Strasbourg, Jan. 25, 1974, Europ.
T.S. No. 82, 13 I.L.M. 540, not yet entered into force.
35. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTION AND THEIR
PENAL PROVISIONS 451-54 (in print 1997).
36. EUROPEAN INTER-STATE CO-OPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, supra note 23.
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crimes against humanity, and, in some respects, war crimes: the limited recogni-
tion and application of the theory of universal jurisdiction to such crimes.37  In-
deed, few states recognize the application of the theory of universality.38
Surely, if more states would recognize and apply this theory of jurisdiction, na-
tional criminal justice systems would have the competence to exercise their ju-
risdiction for such crimes.39 Furthermore, few countries have enacted national
legislation needed to prosecute genocide and crimes against humanity.40
Crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes (under conventional and
customary regulation of armed conflicts), and torture are international crimes
that have risen to the level of jus cogens.41  As a consequence, the following du-
ties arise: the obligation to prosecute or extradite; to provide legal assistance; to
eliminate statutes of limitations; to eliminate immunities of superiors up to and
including heads of states.  Under international law, these obligations are to be
considered as obligatio ergo omnes, the consequence of which is that impunity
cannot be granted.42  The crimes establish inderogable protections and the
mandatory duty to prosecute or to extradite accused perpetrators, and to pun-
ish those found guilty, irrespective of locus since universal jurisdiction pre-
sumably applies.  And, as stated above, there can be no statutory limitations for
                                                          
37. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE 356-66 (3d ed. 1996).
38. See Kenneth Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785,
834 (1988); Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction over Atrocities in Rwanda: Theory and Practice, 1
EUR. J. CRIME. CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 18 (1996).
39. In such cases, however, national legal systems would have to adopt substantive national legis-
lation to prosecute persons accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, as well as
torture.
40. Germany and Italy have included genocide as part of their criminal codes.  France, Canada,
the United Kingdom, and Australia have developed specialized legislation which includes retrospec-
tive application to World War II events, although Australia has not been successful in any prosecu-
tions.  (There have been three cases, all of which resulted in acquittal before trial: DPP v. Polyuk-
hovich; Malone v. Berezowsky; Heinrich Wagner.  See THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 130-34 (Timothy L.H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson eds., 1997).
The United Kingdom is in the process of prosecuting one case (Szymon Serafinowicz) under the
United Kingdom War Crimes Act 1991, France has prosecuted three with one pending, and one case
(R. v. Finta) has been prosecuted in Canada under the Canadian Criminal Law Amendment Act 1985
S.C., 1985, c.19 which amends the Canadian criminal code.  See THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES, supra, at
29; DICK DE MILDT, IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE: PERPETRATORS OF GENOCIDE IN THE RE-
FLECTION OF THEIR POST-WAR PROSECUTION IN WEST GERMANY (1996); Leila Sadat-Wexler, The
Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie
and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 289 (1994).
41. See BASSIOUNI & WISE, supra note 32; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 30, at 489-99; LAURI
HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 713-18 (1988); Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens:
Guarding Interests Fundamental to International Society, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (1988); Karen Parker &
Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 411, 429-35 (1989).
42. See ANDRE DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 45-46
(1996).  For different perspectives on government obligations, see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Respon-
sibility to Investigate and Prosecute Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 449
(1990), which strongly supports such a duty, and José Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations
Committed by Previous Covenants, 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 623 (1990), which is more flexible with re-
spect to such a duty.
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these crimes.  What is needed therefore is the uniform application of these
norms to the same types of victimization irrespective of the contexts in which
they occur and regardless of how they are legally characterized, but the en-
forcement of these norms requires their non-derogation through political set-
tlements and peace arrangements.  The protections afforded victims and the re-
sponsibility befalling perpetrators and their leaders should not be bound by the
legal characterization of the nature of a given conflict, nor should they be
bound by the expectations of political settlements and peace arrangements.
Even though the weaknesses and gaps of the normative scheme discussed
above must be resolved, this does not mean that existing norms are insufficient
to apply to the crimes in question.  There are indeed sufficient norms; what is
lacking is the political will to enforce them.  The establishment of a permanent
international criminal court would certainly contribute to the enhancement of
international enforcement.43 But even when an international criminal court is
established, it will have to be considered as being on the same continuum as na-
tional criminal courts and all these legal systems will have to work in a com-




The relevance of prosecution and other accountability measures to the pur-
suit of peace is that through their effective application they serve as deterrence,
and thus prevent future victimization.  Their relevance to justice is self-evident.
International and national prosecutions are not the only methods of ac-
countability.  There are other options that must be examined, though in the
opinion of this writer there exists a duty to prosecute whether at the interna-
tional or national level, for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
torture.44
Accountability measures fall into three categories: truth, justice, and re-
dress.45  Accountability must be recognized as an indispensable component of
                                                          
43. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, Vols. I & II, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No.22, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996) [hereinafter Pre-
paratory Committee Report]; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Draft Statute International Criminal Tribunal, 9
Nouvelles Itudes Pinales (1993).
44. Whether such cases should be prosecuted before an international or national body is essen-
tially relevant to the issue of primacy of competence and to the issue of effectiveness and fairness of
national prosecution.  Another relevant question arises as to the prosecution of decision-makers, sen-
ior executors and perpetrators of particularly heinous crimes and other violators.  A policy could be
established to prosecute the former before an international criminal court as a first priority, leaving
lesser violators to be prosecuted by national bodies.  In addition, the question arises as to the possibil-
ity of lesser sentences or alternatives to traditional criminal sentences for lesser offenders and for na-
tional bodies to resort to various forms of conditional release, pardons, or amnesties after conviction of
lesser offenders.  These measures would not be contrary to the principle of non-derogation to the duty
to prosecute.
45. For a survey of various accountability measures from a criminological perspective, see Stanley
Cohen, State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability and the Policing of the Past, 20 L.
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peace and eventual reconciliation.  Accountability measures that achieve jus-
tice range from the prosecution of all potential violators to the establishment of
the truth.
Accountability is the antithesis of impunity, which occurs either de facto or
through amnesties.  But amnesty is essentially a form of forgiveness,46 granted
by governments, for crimes committed against a public interest.  But how can
governments forgive themselves for crimes they have committed against oth-
ers?  And how can governments forgive crimes committed by some against
others?  The power to forgive, forget, or overlook in the cases of genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture is not that of the governments
but of the victims.
While amnesty is a deliberate positive action (the act of amnesty), impunity
is an act of exemption, an exemption from punishment, or from injury or loss.47
Amnesty can occur after a person or a group of persons have been convicted,
not beforehand.  The recurrence of pre-prosecution amnesty is therefore an
anomalous phenomenon developed as part of a policy of impunity.
Impunity can also result from de facto conduct, occurring under color of law
when, for example, measures are taken by a government to curtail or prevent
prosecutions.  As a de facto act it can be the product of either the failure to act
or through more deliberate procedural and practical impediments that preclude
prosecution.48  It is also possible to achieve impunity through other practical
impediments.49  The attainment of truth, justice, and redress raises a host of is-
sues, addressed by others in this study.50
The accountability options include the following:
(1) International prosecutions
This includes prosecutions before a permanent international criminal court
                                                          
& SOC. INQUIRY 7 (1995).
46. “Forgiveness, Forgetfulness, or Intentional Overlooking,” THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 67 (Lesley Brown ed. 1993).
47. Id.
48. For example, a short term statute of limitation can preclude prosecution.
49. For example, in the situation involving rape in the former Yugoslavia, prosecutions are in the
Netherlands while victims may be refugees in different countries.  If the victims are required to travel
to the Netherlands without speaking the language, without proper support (familial, social, psychologi-
cal, medical, emotional), and are to be cross-examined there, then they may elect not to testify, the
result being impunity for the crimes committed.  M. Cherif Bassiouni & Marcia McCormick, Sexual
Violence: An Invisible Weapon of War in the Former Yugoslavia (Occasional Paper # 1, 1996, Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University).  This is the case in the Tadic case before the
ICTY, where the defendant was acquitted of charges of rape because the victims were fearful of testi-
fying, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, May 7, 1997) (McDonald, J., dissenting).
50. These issues include: Need redress always be found through traditional monetary or prosecu-
torial mechanisms?  What level of compensation should be given, and to whom?  Can it not, particu-
larly in financially poorer countries, be achieved in a non-monetary form?  Many of the crimes involve
the potential accountability of many people, maybe large sectors of a society.  How many people do
you prosecute to attain justice?  How can the interest and support of the general population be main-
tained?
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or before an ad hoc international criminal court.  As a matter of policy, interna-
tional prosecutions should be limited to leaders, policy-makers, and senior ex-
ecutors; however, this does not preclude prosecutions of other persons at the
national level, which may be necessary to achieve particular goals.51  There
must be prosecution for at least the four jus cogens crimes of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and torture.  There can be no impunity for these
crimes and therefore prosecution is essential.  Why prosecution at the interna-
tional level?  One reason is that international prosecution may be the only way
to reach the leaders, senior executors, and policy makers, who may otherwise
be de facto beyond the reach of local law.52
(2) International and national criminal investigatory commissions
These include internationally established commissions or designated indi-
viduals assigned to collect evidence of criminality in addition to other fact
finding information of a more general nature.53  They can be of importance
both as the basis for future national and international prosecutions as well as to
document from a particular perspective what has happened.
(3) Acknowledgment of responsibility through national mechanisms such as
investigative and truth commissions and reconciliation hearings and findings,
both national and international
This is the acknowledgment of the facts through mechanisms such as truth
commissions and fact-finding investigative bodies.  These commissions, which
can be established internationally, regionally, or nationally, have the mandate
to discover the entirety of the truth or a portion thereof.  Truth Commissions,
however, should not be deemed a substitute for prosecution for the four jus co-
gens crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture.  Al-
though these commissions may run in conjunction with prosecutions, their role
is to establish a record of what has happened, and to disseminate this informa-
tion widely at both the national and the international level.54  Their goals are es-
sentially to serve the end of peace and reconciliation, and they may sometimes
be less relevant to criminal justice, though by no means less important to that
purpose.  The advantage, however, of these commissions is that they establish
                                                          
51. It may be important to prosecute lower level actors in order to generate information regarding
the actions and identities of higher level officials.
52. Victims should also be allowed to participate as partie civile, which is provided for in civilist
legal systems in order to have the right to claim compensatory damages.  See infra note 59 and accom-
panying text.
53. Such as The Commission of Experts for the former Yugoslavia.  See The Final Report of the
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994); Annexes to the Final Report, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2 (1994);  see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The United Nations Commission of
Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 784-805
(1994); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 5
CRIM. L. F. 279-340 (1994).  The Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Committee on the Pre-
vention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities established respectively Rapporteurs and Spe-
cial Rapporteurs whose work and contribution over the years has proven invaluable.
54. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16
HUM. RTS. Q. 597, 607 (1994).
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the broader context of a given conflict, thus eliminating the need at national
and international prosecutions to provide that broader context or to use a given
trial as a means to establish a historical context55 that could in some cases be
deleterious to the case under prosecution or the due process quality of the trial.
It is to be noted that an international or national truth commission is not neces-
sarily a reconciliation commission.  Some of these commissions can also be of a
hybrid nature, taking on investigatory features.56
(4) National prosecution
National prosecutions should include all persons who have committed
criminal acts, subject however to reasonable and justified prosecutorial discre-
tion.  This includes persons who have committed the four jus cogens crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture,57 and there should
be a principle of no general amnesty for these four crimes.  For crimes other
than these four, the national system may develop criteria for selectivity or sym-
bolic prosecution consistent with their laws provided these criteria are not fun-
damentally unfair to the accused.  This does not preclude prosecutorial discre-
tion when the evidence is weak or the criminality tenuous, or where a plea
bargain can lead to the prosecution of more culpable offenders.  It is subject to
standards whereby the exercise of discretion against prosecution unless legally
or factually justifiable should result in remanding the individual to another ac-
countability mechanism.  For example, persons may receive sentences other
than the privation of liberty, including the personal payment of reparations or
compensation to the victims, the undertaking of some form of community
service, or the making of a public apology.  Other options could include the
serving of limited sentences, or the serving of only partial sentences, followed
by an amnesty or pardon, provided there are no a priori blanket amnesties or
pardons that fail to take into account the criminality of the act, and the conse-
quences applicable to each individual receiving such an amnesty or pardon.  It
is also suggested that victims should be allowed to participate as partie civile in
relevant legal proceedings in order to have the right to claim compensatory
damages in an appropriate legal forum.
(5) National lustration mechanisms
National lustration is a purging process whereby individuals who supported
or participated in violations committed by a prior regime may be removed from
their positions and barred from positions of authority or elective positions.
Though punitive in nature, these mechanisms are essentially used as a political
sanction that carries moral, social, political, and economic consequences, but
they do not avail individuals of their due process rights.  The dangers with such
mechanisms is that they tend to deal with classes or categories of people with-
out regard to individual criminal responsibility, and thus lustration may tend to
produce a number of cases of individual injustice.  Furthermore, when lustra-
                                                          
55. GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 3-4 (1966)  (commenting on the Eichmann case).
56. See, e.g., Berat & Shane, supra note 11, at 186.
57. See supra note 40 regarding national legislation.
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tion laws result in loss of any type of earning capacity, this creates secondary
victimization of dependents of these individuals who fall within the ambit of the
lustration legislation.  Lastly, these laws tend to have a stigmatization effect
which carries beyond those who may have deserved such stigmatization and
onto innocent third parties or family members.58
(6) National civil remedies
National civil remedies are the development within civil legislation of the
right to bring suit by victims and their heirs, which enable them to obtain cer-
tain civil remedies.59  For example, individuals should be able to institute legal
actions to compel the inclusion of a person in national criminal prosecution or
in the category of those falling under lustration laws.  Certain types of injunc-
tive remedies can also be contemplated.  National civil remedies can also in-
clude compensation whether as a result of individual or group legal action or as
part of a national program that provides remedies.  Persons having certain
rights under civil law should also be allowed to join in national prosecutions as
partie civile in criminal proceedings.
(7) International mechanisms for the compensation of victims
Victim compensation is a necessity.  When it is in the nature of a national or
international program that allocates a certain amount to compensation, these
programs must provide for a fair administrative method to determine actual
damages as opposed to punitive damages.  Monetary compensation should not
be deemed the only outcome.  Non-monetary forms of compensation should
also be developed, particularly in societies where the economy is unable to sus-
tain large monetary sums.  Note that in 1985 the United Nations adopted a
General Assembly resolution entitled Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power60 and at the last Preparatory Commit-
tee meeting on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, a pro-
posal by Egypt stating the connection between victim compensation and the es-
tablishment of criminal liability was put forward.61
                                                          
58. See supra note 13.
59. See e.g., U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (1988); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2524 (1996); Flartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980).
60. U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34, Dec. 11, 1985, Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of
Crime and Abuse of Power.  For a discussion of this, see International Protection of Victims, 7
NOUVELLES ITUDES PINALES (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988).  See also Security Council Resolution
808 establishing the ICTY: S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).  Resolution 808 stated that the Security Council “[d]ecides that an interna-
tional criminal tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1991.”
61. Preparatory Committee Report, ILC Draft, Art. 43 (c) (“The judgement of the Court shall also
include a determination of the scope and extent of the victimization in order to allow victims to rely on
that judgment for the pursuit of civil remedies, including compensation, either in national courts or
through their Governments, in accordance with international law.”).
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IV
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Which of these accountability measures or what combination thereof is ap-
propriate in light of the circumstances of a given conflict, the expectations of
the parties to the conflict, and the anticipated outcomes will depend on a vari-
ety of factors that must be weighed in the aggregate.  This is obviously not an
easy task.  In the balance lies peace and justice.  It is a task that is both chal-
lenging and fraught with dangers affecting the lives and well-being of many.
But it is a task that must be guided by legal, moral, and ethical considerations.
Accountability is among these considerations.  The accountability mechanisms
described above are not mutually exclusive, they are complementary.  Each
mechanism need not be taken as a whole.  Rather, a portion may be used and
combined with other mechanisms.  No single formula can apply to all types of
conflicts nor can it achieve all desired outcomes.  Just as there is a range in the
types of conflict and a range in types of peace outcomes, there is a correspond-
ing range of accountability mechanisms.  In the final analysis, whichever
mechanism or combination of mechanisms is chosen, it is chosen to achieve a
particular outcome which is, in part, justice, and, wherever possible, reconcilia-
tion, and ultimately, peace.  And in this respect, we cannot look at each mecha-
nism exclusively from the perspective of a crime control model but as an in-
strument of social policy that is designed to achieve a particular set of outcomes
that are not exclusively justice based.  So far, however, there exist no set of in-
ternational guidelines by which to match the type of conflicts, expected peace
outcomes, and eventual accountability mechanisms.  Such guidelines are
needed in order to constitute common bases for the application of these
mechanisms and in order to avoid abuses of and denial of justice.  What should
be achieved is not only a sense of justice, but the elimination of a sense of injus-
tice.  In choosing these mechanisms, it must be remembered that among the
goals of these accountability mechanisms is to educate and prevent and to
shake people from a sense of complacency, one that bureaucracies, including
military and police bureaucracies, tend to foster in a climate of silent conspir-
acy; the omerta of these bureaucracies must be eliminated.62
Accountability mechanisms, if they are to have a salutary effect on the fu-
ture and contribute to peace and reconciliation, must be credible, fair, and as
exhaustive of the truth as possible.  Without that, the embers of yesterday’s
conflict can become the fire of tomorrow’s renewed conflict.  Truth is a means
by which to cleanse, at least in part, the misdeeds of the past.  The fundamental
principle of accountability must take into account:
(1) the cessation of the conflict and thereby the ending of the
process of victimization;
(2) prevention of conflicts in the future;
                                                          
62. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM; A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
14-15 (1963).
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(3) deterrence of conflicts in the future (particularly conflicts
which may be initiated directly after the cessation of a conflict
being addressed);
(4) rehabilitation of the society as a whole and of the victims as
a group; and
(5) reconciliation between the different peoples and groups
within the society.
At a minimum, central truths, as relative as they may be, must be estab-
lished in order to provide a historic record of what occurred to mitigate the
simmering effects of the hardships and hardened feelings resulting from violent
conflicts that produce victimization, to dampen the spirits of revenge and re-
newed conflict, to educate people, and ultimately to prevent future victimiza-
tion.63  Truth is, therefore, an imperative, not an option to be displaced by po-
litical convenience because, in the final analysis, there truly cannot be peace
(meaning reconciliation and the prevention of future conflict arising out of pre-
vious conflictual episodes) without justice (meaning, at the very least, a com-
prehensive exposé of what happened, how, why, and what the sources of re-
sponsibility are).  Forgiveness can follow only from the satisfaction of all
parties, particularly those who have been victimized, after the truth has been
established.
It should be noted in this context of the consideration stated above, how-
ever, that there is a difference between the qualities of mercy and the qualities
of forgiveness.  Whereas forgiveness is a change of heart toward a wrongdoer
that arises out of a decision by the victimized person, and is therefore wholly
subjective, mercy is the suspension or mitigation of a punishment that would
otherwise be described as retribution, and is an objective action that cannot be
taken only by the victim but by those entrusted with government.64  Forgiveness
is not a legal action; rather forgiveness is primarily a relationship between per-
sons.  The arena of resentment and forgiveness is individual and personal in a
way that legal guilt and responsibility are not.65  Institutions, states, and systems
of justice cannot forgive:  They can pardon and act in mercy.66  The act of mercy
may arise out of feelings of compassion or pity for the wrongdoer, however,
these feelings are to be distinguished from those of forgiveness, which belong to
the victim.  What of the relationship of mercy to justice?  Does the obligation
of criminal justice to uphold the rule of law and to impose “just punishment”
run counter to the act of mercy?  Does the act of mercy toward the wrongdoer
neglect the victim’s need for justice?  To what extent are these questions more
imperative in the face of historical denial and its subtext of justification?67  Le-
                                                          
63. See Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 493 (1995).
64. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 33-34, 162-86 (1988).
65. See id. at 33.
66. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 181-
97 (1989); see especially id. at 193.
67. Historical denial is characterized by claims of “nothing happened” or “whatever happened is
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gal developments must address these questions and others because they are es-
sential to both justice and peace.
V
PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
History teaches us that humankind has evolved not only by the laws of God
or the laws of nature, but by the laws of man.  For some, these laws are inspired
by higher ones as understood in the three monotheistic faiths, their differences
notwithstanding.  To others, they represent the laws of humanity to be under-
stood as an expression of the lofty callings of humanism.  More frequently,
however, human practices have been nothing more than the elevation of atavis-
tic predator instincts to self-justifying levels.  It is the difference between these
types of laws that distinguishes civilized homo sapiens from certain predator
species of the animal world.  The former is what the rule of law seeks to
strengthen by means of institutional practices and social controls.  The latter
harnesses the worst of our instincts and limits the more harmful of our conduct
despite the dilemma of right and wrong that confronts us individually and col-
lectively.  Law, legal, and social institutions control and mitigate the conse-
quences of these contradictions: the contradiction of lion and lamb lying side by
side within us and which are magnified by the collective us.
History reveals that the crimes committed in the course of conflict usually
occurred after a breakdown in social controls.  Some ascribe it to cultural fac-
tors and argue that some cultures have a tendency to be more cruel or violent
than others.68  It is difficult to say, however, whether these cultural factors are
endemic or whether they are produced by social and economic conditions and
by the absence of effective legal and social controls.  Accountability mecha-
nisms are therefore important because they tend to shore up legal and social
controls that are preventive, and tend to support the hypothesis of deterrence.
Human nature also has its darker side, and while evil can emerge on its own
without external inducement, it no doubt tends to emerge more harmfully
when external controls are reduced and inducements offered.  Impunity is cer-
tainly one of these inducements, as is the prospect of indifference and the ex-
pectation that the worst deeds may be characterized as justified, reasonable, ac-
ceptable, or normal.
Victimization frequently involves the dehumanization of the prospective
victims, frequently after a stage of psychological preparation by the perpetra-
tors.  Anyone “less than human” can therefore be dealt with as an animal or an
                                                          
exaggerated,” the subtext of justification is characterized by the claim “it was justified” or “there was
no other choice.”  See Israel Charny, The Psychology of Denial of Known Genocide, in 2 GENOCIDE
(Israel Charny ed., 1988); Roger W. Smith, Denial of the Armenian Genocide, in 2 GENOCIDE (Israel
Charny ed., 1988).
68. See, e.g., GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 (1994); JOHN KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF
WARFARE (1993).
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object to which anything can be done, without fear or risk of legal or moral
consequences.  Another approach is for the perpetrators to characterize the
victims as being the perceived threats, thus providing a rationalized justification
for the ensuing victimization.  Such characterization can even rise to the level
of self-defense against individuals or a group of individuals who are portrayed
or perceived as constituting a threat or danger of some degree of plausibility
and immediacy.  Thus, the victims can be portrayed and perceived as being re-
sponsible for the victimization inflicted upon them as if they had done some-
thing to justify it or had called for it by their conduct, or for that matter, as in
the case of the Holocaust, for their very being.69  This rationalization can even
reach the point where the perpetrators can perceive themselves as forced to in-
flict the victimization.  That reasoning can reach the absurd, where the perpe-
trators become the victims in their being “forced” by the actual victims to en-
gage in victimizing conduct.
Such distorted intellectual processes may be the product of inherent evil.
But they are most frequently the product of evil manipulation by the few of the
many.  From the days of Goebbels’ and Streicher’s propaganda to the 1994
Rwanda Hutu incitements to kill the Tutsis, the use of propaganda has been the
main instrument of group violence.  Obviously the less educated or the more
gullible a society is, the more it is likely to be induced by such false beliefs.  But
there are many other factors that influence the credibility of such techniques,
which use the accumulation of uncontradicted falsehood over time to produce
their deleterious effect.  And it is during that time that the international com-
munity should mobilize on the basis of certain early warning signals that group
victimization is about to occur.  Thus the prevention of such forms of victimiza-
tion must be developed.
Accountability mechanisms appear to focus on events after the fact, and
may appear to be solely punitive, but they are also designed to be preventive
through enhancing commonly shared values and through deterrence.  Account-
ability therefore has a necessary punitive aspect.  However it is also integrally
linked to prevention and deterrence.  The weakness in the accountability argu-
ment is that it is after the fact, but its strength is that it has a crucial role to play
in the formation and strengthening of values and the future prevention of vic-
timization within society.
As stated above, impunity is the antithesis of accountability.  To foster it or
condone it can be illegal and immoral.  Frequently it is also counterproductive
to the ultimate goal of peace.  Indeed, large-scale victimization arising out of
international crimes is never safely tucked away in the limbo of the past.  In-
stead, it remains fixed in time in an ongoing present that frequently calls for
vengeance and longs for redress.  Victims need to have their victimization ac-
knowledged, the wrongs committed against them decried, and the criminal per-
petrators, or at least their leaders, punished, and compensation provided for
the survivors.  Above all, the lessons of the past must instruct the future in or-
                                                          
69. See RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (3 Vols. 1985).
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der to avoid repeating the same mistakes, and to ensure some prevention and
deterrence against similar occurrences.
A more outcome-determinative consideration of the processes of peace and
the prospects of justice is to limit the discretion of leaders who are involved in
political settlement processes that are intended to bring an end to conflicts.
These leaders’ values, expectations, personal ambitions, positioning for power,
the degree of public support they possess, and above all their responsibilities in
connection with the initiation of the conflict and the conduct of the hostilities,
particularly when international humanitarian law violations have occurred, af-
fect the outcome of political settlements and bear the most on the subsequent
pursuit and integrity of justice processes.  Leaders involved in conflict situa-
tions are those who negotiate political settlements, usually through the media-
tion efforts of other leaders.  Without the involvement of leaders of conflict
situations, there can be no cessation of hostilities, and that is why they are es-
sential to the pursuit of peace.  But, conversely, they may also be opposed to
the pursuit of justice.  That is the essence of the mediator’s dilemma—how to
bring about peace without sacrificing justice.  In most conflicts, that dilemma
has been resolved at the expense of justice.  To avoid this dilemma in the fu-
ture, the peace negotiators acting in good faith in the pursuit of peace must be
immune from the pressures of having to barter away justice for political settle-
ments.  That card must not be left to them to play in the course of negotiating
political settlements.  Impunity must, therefore, be removed from the “tool
box”70 of political negotiators.
VI
CONCLUSION
Impunity for international crimes and for systematic and widespread viola-
tions of fundamental human rights is a betrayal of our human solidarity with
the victims of conflicts to whom we owe a duty of justice, remembrance, and
compensation.  To remember and to bring perpetrators to justice is a duty we
also owe to our own humanity and to the prevention of future victimization.71
To paraphrase George Santayana, if we cannot learn from the lessons of the
past and stop the practice of impunity, we are condemned to repeat the same
mistakes and to suffer their consequences.  The reason for our commitment to
this goal can be found in the eloquent words of John Donne:
No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent,
                                                          
70. W. Michael Reisman, Institutions and Practices for Restoring and Maintaining Public Order, 6
DUKE J. COMP. & INT. L. 175 (1995).  Reisman notes that “[t]here is no general institution that can be
applied as a paradigm for all circumstances. In each context, an institution appropriate to the protec-
tion and re-establishment of public order in the unique circumstances that prevail must be fashioned
such that it provides the greatest return on all the relevant goals of public order.”  Id. at 185.  The
question is to what extent accountability mechanisms are deemed a part of “public order”?  Where do
such mechanisms rank; what is their value?
71. To paraphrase George Orwell:  He who controls the past, controls the future; who controls the
present, controls the past.  By recording the truth, educating the public, preserving memory, and trying
the accused it is possible to prevent abuses in the future.  See Cohen, supra note 45, at 49.
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a part of the main ….
Any man’s death diminishes me because I am involved in mankind,
and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee ….72
                                                          
72. Devotions upon Emergent Occasions XVII (1624).
